President Donald Trump has waived sweeping new tariffs and sanctions targeting Russia under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, blocking major penalties from taking effect as scheduled on October 18 while leaving the underlying law intact. The decision, formalized in an October 16 order, suspends new duties of 500% on Russian goods and 100% on imports from certain countries purchasing Russian energy or facilitating sanctions evasion.
Trump also waived numerous financial, investment and other restrictions authorized by the law, which he signed on September 18. The White House said the waivers serve U.S. national interests and that the required certification and explanatory report had been submitted to Congress.
The decision represents a consequential shift in the law’s immediate implementation. Rather than repealing Congress’s sanctions framework, the administration has used an authority written into that framework to prevent many of its central measures from being applied. The distinction matters for U.S. importers, financial institutions, Russian energy customers and countries potentially exposed to additional American trade penalties.
What the Executive Order Changes
The 2026 Graham Act, enacted as Public Law 119–111, established new sanctions and trade restrictions intended to increase economic pressure on Russia. Section 112 required the president, within 30 days of enactment, to increase duties on Russian-origin goods to a rate of up to 500% ad valorem.
Section 113 separately provided for tariffs of up to 100% on goods imported from specified countries linked to purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas, or to Russian oil sanctions evasion. Trump’s executive order, dated October 16, establishes a 500% increase on Russian goods and 100% increases for the specified third-country categories.
But Section 4(a) of the same order waives the application of those duties. This creates an important legal and operational distinction: the order specifies substantial tariff increases but simultaneously prevents those new Graham Act duties from applying while the waiver remains in force.
The published document therefore does not establish that importers must immediately pay the additional 500% or 100% duties. Nor does it eliminate tariffs imposed under separate legal authorities.
Section 2(d) explicitly addresses other applicable customs duties, including those arising under existing trade statutes. The waiver concerns the additional Graham Act measures, not every U.S. trade restriction involving Russia.
Which Sanctions Were Waived
The decision extends considerably beyond tariffs. Section 4(b) waives the sanctions and restrictions under Section 102(d) of the Graham Act, while explicitly preserving sanctions and other measures under specified pre-existing executive orders addressing harmful Russian government activities.
Section 4(c) then waives provisions covering Sections 102(a), 102(e), 103 through 111, and 117. Those sections address an extensive range of economic activity, including sanctions on Russian government-linked individuals and entities, financial institutions, certain fund transfers, securities trading, investment, energy-sector transactions, sovereign debt and international financial messaging services.
The legislation also addresses uranium-related restrictions and sanctions. The scope is significant because the act was designed to restrict more than direct trade in Russian commodities. Its financial provisions could affect institutions dealing with designated Russian entities, while investment and sovereign-debt provisions could constrain additional channels of financing.
However, the presidential waiver must not be confused with a blanket authorization for previously prohibited transactions. Existing sanctions imposed under other statutes, regulations and executive orders require separate legal assessment. The October 16 order specifically preserves identified pre-existing Russia-related measures.
For businesses and financial institutions, the practical consequence is that compliance obligations cannot be determined solely by whether a Graham Act provision was waived. The relevant legal authority underlying each restriction remains essential.
Why the Tariff Distinction Matters
A comparison of the statute and executive order reveals an important feature of the policy. Congress established a sanctions system capable of extending U.S. trade penalties beyond Russia itself, reaching countries involved in Russian energy purchases and sanctions evasion. Section 113(c) defines the targeted countries using specific purchasing behavior, import rankings and a historical measurement period.
For the initial purchasing category, a country must have knowingly made qualifying new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas on or after the statutory 30-day threshold and ranked among the five largest importers by volume during the preceding 12-month reference period.
A separate category covers the five leading countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion. The statute also contains a natural-gas exception tied to import volumes and demonstrable reductions in Russian gas purchases. These conditions matter because merely purchasing Russian energy does not, by itself, establish every statutory element required for additional tariffs.
The order directs the U.S. Trade Representative, working with the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy, to monitor relevant energy transactions and potential sanctions evasion. That monitoring responsibility remains in place despite the waiver. The resulting framework separates three stages: determining which countries meet statutory conditions, establishing applicable penalties, and deciding whether those penalties will actually be applied.
This distinction is particularly important for countries with substantial commercial exposure to Russian energy. India and China have featured prominently in the broader debate over Russian oil purchases, but the October 16 order does not publish a definitive country-by-country tariff determination or establish a new payable Graham Act rate for either country. A specific national tariff exposure requires the relevant statutory classification, supporting trade data and any applicable administrative determination.
Waiver Authority and Congressional Oversight
The legal foundation for Trump’s action is Section 115 of the statute. That provision permits the president to waive sanctions, restrictions or duties under Title I, provided Congress receives a written national-interest certification and a report explaining its basis before the waiver is issued.
The statute also allows certain certifications and explanations to be consolidated. In the executive order, Trump states that the required material has been submitted. However, the order itself does not reproduce the underlying congressional report or provide a detailed explanation of the economic or national-security calculations supporting the decision.
That leaves an important documentary question: what specific factors did the administration present to Congress as justification for suspending the sanctions? The available executive-order text establishes the administration’s declared national-interest determination, but it does not independently disclose the complete reasoning contained in the required report.
The distinction between waiver and termination is also significant. Section 117 establishes separate conditions for terminating sanctions and includes congressional review procedures. For measures concerning Russia, those conditions include provisions related to a peace agreement accepted by Ukraine and the cessation of Russian military hostilities.
Section 115’s national-interest waiver operates through a different legal mechanism. The October 16 action uses waiver authority rather than establishing that all statutory conditions for permanent termination have been satisfied. That difference helps explain how the administration could suspend major sanctions provisions without Congress first repealing the legislation.
How Long Will Waivers Last?
The executive order does not establish a fixed expiration date for the waivers. Section 4(d) provides that they remain effective until the president or secretary of state, following the specified consultations, determines that further action is appropriate.
That language gives the executive branch continuing discretion over whether the suspended provisions should remain inactive. It also means the order itself does not guarantee that the new tariffs will automatically begin after a 60-day review period.
Any future restoration, modification or replacement must be assessed against the governing legal requirements and subsequent official actions. Meanwhile, Section 3 preserves monitoring duties for the U.S. Trade Representative, including reporting developments that could warrant reconsideration of the waivers.
This combination of suspended penalties and continued surveillance leaves the sanctions framework available as a potential instrument of future economic pressure. The statute also has a broader sunset provision. Section 203 provides for most of Division A to terminate five years after enactment, while excluding Section 201, which extends the Iran Sanctions Act’s expiration year from 2026 to 2031.
The presidential order does not repeal those statutory provisions. For importers and financial institutions, the immediate issue is therefore not whether the Graham Act exists, but which requirements currently apply and which remain suspended.
The next meaningful development would be an official decision changing the waivers, a new implementing measure, or the release of documentation clarifying the administration’s national-interest justification.
Until then, the October 16 order leaves the United States with a broad Russia sanctions framework whose most consequential new trade penalties have been waived rather than put into immediate operation.
